More important than the changes in the technical details was the alteration of the plan politically. In the Schlieffen plan 'there was no ultimatum to Belgium, but the German army, without any notification, was first to deploy on the Dutch-Belgian frontie
r.' As the
German plan would be divulged by this, it was assumed that the French would take countermeasures These, according to Schlieffen's views, could only be the occupation of the natural defensive position in the Meuse valley south of Namur; and thus the French
would themselves violate Belgian neutrality. Such a plan must have been at least considered by the French, and in 1914 the German General Staff took it for granted that they would advance to the Meuse. All this presumed that Belgian neutrality would not
be broken by Germany first. Such a step Graf Schlieffen desired, if possible, to avoid. He wished to leave sufficient time so that, in one way or another, the German statesmen would be able to evade the reproach of the violation of Belgian neutrality. 'Th
at Liege would always be captured sufficiently soon after the entry of the German army into Belgium, to serve as the railway junction for reinforcements and supply, could be accepted.'